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BANKRUPTCY—CONFUSION AND AMBIGUITY: THE POST-
BAPCPA UNCERTAINTY CONCERNING THE RIDE-THROUGH 
OPTION IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine Tim “the trickster” Thompson, who recently purchased a new 
home fully aware that he could not afford it. At that time, Tim took out a 
mortgage on the home with State Bank, and State Bank took the appropriate 
steps to ensure that its loan was secured. However, Tim filed bankruptcy in 
a jurisdiction that allowed the ride-through option. Consequently, Tim was 
able to continue making payments to State Bank throughout the bankruptcy 
while his personal liability for the debt would be discharged at the end of the 
bankruptcy. At that point, State Bank could only repossess the home if Tim 
defaulted, and if Tim did not take care of the home, State Bank likely would 
not recover the amount owed for the loan. 
Now imagine Grandma Betty, who has worked and sacrificed for her 
family for many years. In fact, for years she has consistently made payments 
on her mortgage to ensure that her children and grandchildren would have a 
place to live. However, Grandma Betty recently realized that she could not 
afford to continue paying her bills, so she filed bankruptcy. She wanted to 
keep her home, but she could not afford to redeem the debt. And because 
Grandma Betty filed bankruptcy in a jurisdiction that did not allow the ride-
through option, her only choice was to negotiate a reaffirmation agreement 
with the Second Bank, the mortgagee. However, Second Bank refused to 
reach a reasonable agreement. As a consequence, poor, sweet Grandma Bet-
ty had no option but to accept an agreement on unfavorable terms and lose 
the “fresh start” that bankruptcy is meant to provide. 
As this imaginary scenario indicates, the ride-through option is conse-
quential to both secured creditors and bankruptcy debtors. Unfortunately, 
the current status of the ride-through option in the Eighth Circuit is unclear. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not heard the issue, and the intra-
circuit split has never been resolved.1 Additionally, Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Code under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) in a way that has since created more un-
 
 1. In re Covel, 474 B.R. 702, 704 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2012). In 2004, the United States 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit upheld a bankruptcy court’s decision to lift 
the automatic stay after a debtor had attempted to use the ride-through option. Sanabria v. 
Am. Nat’l Bank (In re Sanabria), 317 B.R. 59 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2004). However, in so decid-
ing, the court did not consider the existence of the ride-through option. Id. at 60–61. Rather, 
the court merely discussed the issue of whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion. Id. 
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certainty.2 As a result, when a debtor attempts to retain property by using the 
ride-through option within the Eighth Circuit, the ability of the debtor to 
discharge personal liability for certain secured debts is uncertain. 
This note will discuss this Eighth Circuit issue and argue for a limited 
ride-through option for both real and personal property. Part II.A will de-
scribe the basic law surrounding the controversy.3 Part II.B will provide a 
background for the ride-through option by discussing pre-BAPCPA statutes 
and decisions from Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts.4 Part II.C will discuss 
BAPCPA and changes that occurred to the Bankruptcy Code as a result.5 
Part II.D will discuss post-BAPCPA Eighth Circuit bankruptcy court deci-
sions.6 Finally, Part III will analyze why the courts within the Eighth Circuit 
should apply a limited ride-through option for both real and personal proper-
ty.7 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Basic Law Surrounding the Controversy 
The controversy surrounding the ride-through option involves the statu-
tory requirements for the statement of intention under 11 U.S.C. § 
521(a)(2).8 The statement of intention is a document that the debtor must file 
with the bankruptcy court that indicates whether the debtor intends to sur-
render or retain certain encumbered property.9 This statement of intention 
must be filed within thirty days after filing a petition for bankruptcy.10 If the 
debtor chooses to retain the property, then “if applicable,” the debtor must 
“specify[] [in the statement of intention] that such property is claimed as 
exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor 
intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property.”11 
 
 2. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
 4. See infra Part II.B. 
 5. See infra Part II.C. 
 6. See infra Part II.D. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (Supp. 2011). 
 9. See id. For a discussion of this section and the statement of intention, see GEORGE 
M. TREISTER, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, 343, 345, 347 (6th ed. 2006). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. The statutory language of this section is as follows: 
The debtor shall (2) if an individual debtor’s schedule of assets and liabilities in-
cludes debts which are secured by property of the estate—(A) within thirty days 
after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 of this title or on or before 
the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or within such addition-
al time as the court, for cause, within such period fixes, file with the clerk a 
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Reaffirmation—as provided in § 521(a)(2)—is defined in § 524(c).12 
Section 524(c) specifically provides that a reaffirmation agreement is “[a]n 
agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for 
which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable . . . .”13 
Put simply, the debtor and creditor enter into a new agreement for the se-
cured debt in which they can contemplate new or similar terms. However, 
the reaffirmation agreement must be completed before discharge of the debt 
in order to be effective.14 If performed correctly, the debtor will continue to 
face personal liability not only for the collateral but also for the entire debt 
after her bankruptcy case is discharged.15 
Redemption—as provided in § 521(a)(2)—is defined by certain re-
quirements in § 722.16 Section 722 provides that the debtor meet three pri-
mary requirements for redemption.17 First, the property that the debtor 
chooses to redeem must be “intended primarily for personal, family, or 
household use.”18 Second, the property must have been abandoned by the 
bankruptcy trustee or able to be exempted by the debtor.19 Third, the debtor 
 
statement of his intention with respect to the retention or surrender of such prop-
erty and, if applicable, specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that 
the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm 
debts secured by such property. 
Id. 
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2006); see also Nancy C. Dreher, Reaffirmation, in 
BANKRUPTCY MANUAL § 8:4 (Clay Mattson, et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012) (providing a discussion 
of reaffirmation agreements). 
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c). 
 14. Id. at § 524(c)(1). 
 15. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empiri-
cal Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 714–15 (1999); Ned W. Waxman, Re-
demption or Reaffirmation: The Debtor’s Exclusive Means of Retaining Possession of Collat-
eral in Chapter 7, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 187, 188 (1994). In order for the reaffirmation to be 
effective, certain procedures provided by the bankruptcy code must be followed. See 11 
U.S.C. § 524(c). Specifically, disclosures must be provided to the debtor before the reaffir-
mation agreement becomes binding, id. at § 524(c)(2); the reaffirmation agreement along 
with an affidavit certifying certain requirements must be filed with the bankruptcy court, id. 
at § 524(c)(3)(A)–(C); the debtor cannot rescind the agreement before a sixty day deadline, 
id. at § 524(c)(4); and the court must approve the agreement if the debtor is not advised by an 
attorney throughout the reaffirmation process and the agreement is secured by personal prop-
erty, id. at § 524(c)(6)(A). If the parties follow these procedures, the reaffirmation agreement 
becomes effective, the debtor can retain the property as long as the payments for the debt are 
made, and the debtor will be personally liable for the debt after the bankruptcy. Culhane & 
White, supra note 15, at 714. 
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2006); see also Nancy C. Dreher, Redemption, in BANKRUPTCY 
MANUAL § 10:20 (Clay Mattson, et al., eds., 5th ed. 2012) (providing a discussion of redemp-
tion). 
 17. 11 U.S.C. § 722. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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must pay the secured creditor “the amount of the allowed secured claim of 
such holder that is secured by such lien in full at the time of redemption.”20 
If all three of these requirements are met, then the debtor will be able to re-
tain the property free and clear of that lien after bankruptcy.21 
Exemption—as provided by § 521(a)(2)—is defined by various por-
tions of state and federal law.22 Under these laws, the debtor is able to per-
form exemption by retaining certain property or a certain amount of the pro-
ceeds from the property.23 Exemptions under state law “vary by state” and 
typically include common exemptions such as a homestead exemption—
where the debtor is able to keep no more than a certain amount of the value 
of the homestead—and personal property exemptions—where the debtor is 
able to keep no more than a certain amount of the value of personal proper-
ty.24 Federal exemptions provide similar allowances.25 
Although § 521(a)(2) explicitly provides only that the debtor may 
choose redemption, reaffirmation, or exemption, many courts have struggled 
with whether these options are exclusive.26 Several courts have indicated 
that the debtor may take advantage of the non-statutory ride-through op-
tion.27 The ride-through option allows a debtor whose payments on the debt 
are up-to-date to retain the collateral that secures the debt without filing a 
statement of intention or obtaining the creditor’s consent.28 In doing so, the 
debtor must continue making payments for the debt throughout the bank-
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Laws”, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1081, 1094–96 (2012); Paul M. Hoffmann & Jerald S. Enslein, Overview of Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 62 J. MO. B. 300, 302–03 (2006); 
see also Joan N. Feeney, Exemption, in BANKRUPTCY MANUAL § 5:34 (Clay Mattson, et al 
eds., 5th ed. 2012) (providing a discussion of exemption). 
 23. Austin, supra note 22, at 1094–95. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. (“The Bankruptcy Code also has an exemption schedule, which is set forth in § 
522(d).”). 
 26. See Christopher M. Hogan, Note, Will the Ride-Through Ride Again?, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 882, 893–94 (2008). 
 27. See, e.g., Price v. Del. State Police Fed. Credit Union U.S. Tr. (In re Price), 370 F.3d 
362, 378–79 (3d Cir. 2004), superseded by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 362(h); McClellan Fed. Cred-
it Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded by statute, 11 
U.S.C. § 362(h); Capital Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 
F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 1997), superseded by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 362(h); Home Owners Fund-
ing Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 349 (4th Cir. 1992) superseded 
by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 362(h); Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th 
Cir. 1989) superseded by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). 
 28. In re Covel, 474 B.R. 702, 704 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2012); see Jean Braucher, Rash 
and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral 
Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 475 (2005) [hereinafter Braucher, 
Rash]. 
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ruptcy.29 Once the debtor’s bankruptcy case has ended and the debtor has 
received a discharge of all remaining debts, the debtor maintains no personal 
liability for the secured debt for which she “rode-through.”30 At that point, 
the creditor’s only available remedy is to repossess the collateral when the 
debtor defaults.31 
B.    Condition of the Ride-through in the Eighth Circuit 
Currently, the condition of the ride-through option in the Eighth Circuit 
is unclear. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has never ruled on the is-
sue,32 and the bankruptcy courts’ decisions—both pre- and post-BAPCPA—
remain in conflict.33 Additionally, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code 
with BAPCPA in such a way that has added to the confusion.34 This section 
details this history and current standing of the ride-through option in the 
Eighth Circuit. 
1. Bankruptcy Courts Hold the Ride-through Options Available 
Prior to BAPCPA, the Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts were not in 
agreement on whether the ride-through option was allowable.35 Some bank-
ruptcy courts determined that debtors could utilize the ride-through option,36 
while others concluded the opposite.37 Those bankruptcy courts that deter-
mined that the ride-through option was a valid tool for the bankruptcy debt-
or did so by considering the specific language of §§ 521(2)(A) 38 and 
 
 29. See Allyson MacKenna, Note, Bankrutpcy—Mimsy Were the Borogoves: A “Ride-
Through” the Looking Glass with the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 657, 666–67 (2011). 
 30. Id. at 667. 
 31. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, But Can She Keep the Car? Some 
Thoughts on Collateral Retention in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 471, 478 (2002). 
 32. In re Covel, 474 B.R. at 704. 
 33. See id. at 704 n.2. 
 34. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 35. Compare In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. 286, 288–89 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002), 
and In re Parker, 142 B.R. 327, 328–31 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992), and In re Manring, 129 
B.R. 198, 199–200 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991), with In re Gerling, 175 BR. 295, 298 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1994), and In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 302, 305 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992), and In re 
Griffin, 143 B.R. 535, 537 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991). 
 36. E.g., In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 288–89. 
 37. E.g., In re Gerling, 175 BR. at 298. 
 38. See In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 289; In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 328; In re 
Manring, 129 B.R. at 199. Prior to BAPCPA, what is currently § 521(a)(2), was labeled § 
521(2)(A). 
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521(2)(C),39 the enforceability of ipso facto clauses,40 and the legislative 
history of the statute.41
 
These bankruptcy courts first considered the statutory language of § 
521(2)(A) in a way that allowed them to determine that the “if applicable” 
statutory language should mandate the ride-through.42 However, each of 
these courts did so in a slightly different manner.43 For example, in In re 
Parker,44 the bankruptcy court explained that the language was “poorly 
drafted and ambiguous” and supported at least two interpretations.45 Because 
of this, the court was able to analyze the factors that indicated the ride-
through was allowed.46 On the other hand, in In re Canady-Houston,47 the 
court determined that because the language “lack[ed] two things: (1) an in-
flexible time schedule, and (2) a penalty for failure to comply,” the language 
did not create “mandatory parameters,” and the ride-through should have 
been allowed.48 In the end, these courts looked to factors other than the stat-
utory language that allowed them to determine that a ride-through option 
was necessary.49 
Another consideration was the language of § 521(2)(C).50 The original 
§ 521(2)(C) stated that “nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this para-
graph shall alter the debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to such prop-
erty under this title.”51 In Parker, the bankruptcy court determined that if the 
court restricted the debtor to only the three statutory options, the debtor’s 
rights would be altered as expressly prohibited in § 521(a)(2)(C).52 The 
 
 39. See In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 329. 
 40. See In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 288–89; In re Manring, 129 B.R. at 199. 
 41. See In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 328–29. 
 42. See In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 288–89; In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 328; In re 
Manring, 129 B.R. at 199. 
 43. In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 288–89; In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 328; In re 
Manring, 129 B.R. at 199. 
 44. In re Parker, 142 B.R. 327. 
 45. Id. at 328. 
 46. Id. at 328–31. 
 47. In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. 286. 
 48. Id. at 289. 
 49. Id. at 288–89; In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 328; In re Manring, 129 B.R. 198, 199 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991). For example, in Parker, after noting that the statutory language was 
“poorly drafted and ambiguous,” the court explained that 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) could be 
interpreted as explicitly providing only reaffirmation, redemption, or exemption, or implicitly 
providing a non-statutory ride-through option. In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 328. On the other 
hand, in Canady-Houston, the court never explicitly stated that the language was ambiguous, 
but it determined that the ride-through was available by relying on other factors. In re Cana-
dy-Houston, 281 B.R. at 288–89. 
 50. In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 329. 
 51. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(C)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52. Id. (“Therefore, interpreting § 521(2)(A) and (B) literally to limit a debtor’s alterna-
tives would, in effect, result in a tacit repeal of the permissive nature of the rights conferred 
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bankruptcy court explained that the bankruptcy provisions concerning the 
ride-through option had a “permissive nature,” and this would be altered if 
the statutory language was read as providing only reaffirmation, redemption, 
or exemption.53 As a result, the statutory language of § 521(2)(C) could also 
reflect the idea that the ride-through option was permissible.54 
After considering the statutory language, the Eighth Circuit bankruptcy 
courts also considered the enforceability of ipso facto clauses in bankrupt-
cy.55 Ipso facto clauses usually provide that “the mere filing of a bankruptcy 
petition—be it Chapter 7, Chapter 11, or Chapter 13—was an event of de-
fault, created an immediate acceleration of any and all sums due . . . and 
allowed the creditor to deem itself insecure and repossess the collateral.”56 
When considering these clauses, the bankruptcy courts in Canady-Houston 
noted that eliminating the ride-through had the same effect.57 Lifting the 
automatic stay and allowing a creditor to obtain the collateral when the 
debtor was up-to-date on her payments could be considered essentially iden-
tical in effect to an ipso facto clause.58 However, because the Bankruptcy 
Code did not allow for the enforceability of ipso facto clauses, eliminating 
the ride-through and creating a situation similar in effect was not permissi-
ble.59 
The Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts also considered the legislative 
history and intent of § 521(a)(2).60 Evidence from legislative hearings creat-
ed the impression that § 521(a)(2) was intended primarily to be a notice pro-
vision.61 In Parker, the bankruptcy court explained that under the original 
Bankruptcy Code creditors were unable to determine the debtors’ intentions 
for the creditors’ collateral without lifting the automatic stay.62 Based on the 
legislative history, the court determined that the statement of intention was 
created simply to remedy this problem.63 Thus, if this provision was created 
for providing notice to the debtor, the options in § 521 of redemption, reaf-
 
upon a debtor by 11 U.S.C. §§ 524 and 722. There is no clear indication that Congress ever 
intended to repeal portions of sections 524 and 722.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. 286, 288–89 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002); In re Man-
ring, 129 B.R. 198, 199 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991). 
 56. In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 289. 
 57. Id.; see also In re Manring, 129 B.R. at 199 (mentioning the comparison between 
ipso facto clauses and the prohibition of the ride-through option). 
 58. In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 289. 
 59. Id. 
 60. In re Parker, 142 B.R. 327, 328–29 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 328. 
 63. Id. 
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firmation, and exemption were probably not meant to be exclusive, and the 
ride-through should be permitted.64 
Overall, several Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts determined that debt-
ors could ride-through bankruptcy when they were up-to-date on the pay-
ments of the debt.65 These courts analyzed factors such as the statutory lan-
guage of the pre-BAPCPA provisions of §§ 521(2)(A) and 521(2)(C), the 
similarity of ipso facto clauses to the interpretation that the ride-through did 
not exist, and legislative history.66 In discussing the factors, the courts de-
termined that the ride-through option was clearly supported and that holding 
otherwise would inhibit the legislature’s intent in creating the Bankruptcy 
Code.67 
2. Bankruptcy Courts Hold Ride-through Option Unavailable 
Prior to BAPCPA, other Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts interpreted § 
521(2)(A) as also providing three mandatory options of reaffirmation, re-
demption, and exemption, indicating that the ride-through option was not 
available to debtors.68 These courts analyzed factors including the plain lan-
guage of the statute69 and the similarity between the ride-through option and 
reaffirmation agreements made with continuing installation payments.70 
Each of these bankruptcy courts determined that the plain language of 
11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) did not mandate the ride-through.71 For example, in 
In re Gerling,72 the bankruptcy court adopted the view of In re Taylor73 and 
determined that the statutory language of § 521(2)(A) clearly indicated that 
redemption, reaffirmation, and exemption were the only options available to 
 
 64. See id. 
 65. In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. 286, 289 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002); In re Parker, 
142 B.R. at 331; In re Manring, 129 B.R. 198, 200 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991). 
 66. In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 288–89; In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 328–31; In re 
Manring, 129 B.R. at 199–200. 
 67. In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 289; In re Parker, 142 B.R. at 331; In re Man-
ring, 129 B.R. at 200. 
 68. In re Gerling, 175 BR. 295, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 
302, 305 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992); In re Griffin, 143 B.R. 535, 537 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991); 
see also In re Podnar, 307 B.R. 667, 670 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003) (stating that the ride-
through option should not be available to debtors); In re Thomas, 186 B.R. 470 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 1995) (noting that the best interpretation is that where the ride-through is not available). 
 69. In re Gerling, 175 B.R. at 297–98; In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. at 304; In re Griffin, 143 
B.R. at 537. 
 70. In re Gerling, 175 B.R. at 298–99; In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. at 304; In re Griffin, 143 
B.R. at 537. 
 71. In re Gerling, 175 B.R. at 297–98; In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. at 304; In re Griffin, 143 
B.R. at 537. 
 72. In re Gerling, 175 BR. 295. 
 73. Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993). 
2014] POST-BAPCA UNCERTAINTY 497 
the debtor.74 In citing Taylor, the court noted several phrases within the stat-
utory language of § 521 that indicated the statute did not allow the ride-
through option.75 First, the Bankruptcy Code provided that the language “if 
applicable” clearly indicated that when the debtor does not surrender the 
collateral, filing a statement of intention becomes “applicable” at that 
point.76 The bankruptcy court explained that “since a debtor could not re-
deem or reaffirm with respect to property that is surrendered, the phrase ‘if 
applicable’ can only refer to the redemption of property or the reaffirmation 
of the debt.”77 
Second, the court indicated that the debtor could not meet the require-
ment that debtors “perform their intention within forty-five days after the 
Statement of Intent is filed” pursuant to the original § 521(2)(B) when 
choosing the ride-through option.78 When the debtor retains the property by 
ride-through, the debtor does not perform any action.79 Thus, the forty-five 
day deadline could not be met.80 As a result, the bankruptcy court deter-
mined that the language of the code provided an exclusive list of options of 
reaffirmation, redemption, and exemption from which the debtor may 
choose.81 
These bankruptcy courts also considered the similarity of the ride-
through option to reaffirmation agreements made by continuing installation 
payments.82 In In re Griffin,83 the bankruptcy court adopted the opinions of 
In re Bell84 and In re Edwards.85 In Bell and Edwards, the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuit Courts of Appeals explained that the ride-through is—in essence—a 
reaffirmation agreement made through installation payments.86 However, 
 
 74. In re Gerling, 175 B.R. at 297–98 (citing In re Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516); see also In re 
Griffin, 143 B.R. at 537 (adopting the reasoning of In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 
1990), and determining that redemption, reaffirmation, and exemption were the only options 
available to the debtor when retaining collateral). 
 75. In re Gerling, 175 B.R. at 297–98. 
 76. Id. at 297–98. In In re Kennedy, the bankruptcy court also explained that “if applica-
ble” indicated that the statement of intention is required when the debtor chose not to surren-
der the property. 137 B.R. at 304. The court explained that “if the debtor chooses to retain the 
collateral, he must specify whether the collateral is exempt, whether it will be redeemed or 
the debt reaffirmed.” Id. at 304 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A)). The court was essentially 
following the precedent set by the court in In re Griffin, 143 B.R. at 537. In re Kennedy, 137 
B.R. at 304. 
 77. In re Gerling, 175 B.R. at 298. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. In re Griffin, 143 B.R. 535, 537 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991). 
 83. In re Griffin, 143 B.R. 535. 
 84. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 85. In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 86. In re Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386; In re Bell, 700 F.2d at 1055. 
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both courts noted that this “negates the voluntarism [of reaffirmation agree-
ments] contemplated by the statute. No debtor would reaffirm personal lia-
bility unless required to do so.”87 For that reason, the ride-through could not 
be allowed.88 
Overall, these Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts determined that the 
ride-through was not an available option because of the meaning of the plain 
language of § 521(a)(2) and the position that the ride-through is similar to 
reaffirmation by installation payments.89 As a result of analyzing these fac-
tors, the bankruptcy courts determined that debtors could not utilize the ride-
through option. 
C. BAPCPA and Changes to the Ride-through Option 
In 2005, BAPCPA was enacted into law, and many sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code were amended and added.90 Important changes were made 
to the ride-through option as a result of BAPCPA; however, the primary 
change occurred to the ride-through option for personal property.91 Several 
scholars and courts have indicated that the statutes affecting the ride-through 
option were amended in such a way that seems to eliminate the personal 
property ride-through option.92 
The first indication of the changes to the personal property ride-through 
option can be found in § 521.93 The controversial language concerning the 
 
 87. In re Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386 (citation omitted). 
 88. Id. at 1387. 
 89. In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295, 299 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 
302, 305 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992); In re Griffin, 143 B.R. 535, 537 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991). 
 90. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). BAPCPA was 
enacted primarily because legislators were concerned that the bankruptcy system was being 
abused. See Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 349, 349 (2008) (“The title is a statement of two worthy purposes: 
abuse prevention and consumer protection. Legislative history supports finding these two 
purposes to be primary, along with a third purpose—fairness to creditors and debtors.”) 
[hereinafter Braucher, Guide]; Sean C. Currie, Article, The Multiple Purposes of Bankruptcy: 
Restoring Bankruptcy’s Social Insurance Function After BAPCPA, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. 
L.J. 241, 248 (2009) (“Four of the Commissioners on the [National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission] prepared a lengthy dissent opposing the report; they argued the recommenda-
tions for consumer bankruptcy: (1) did not ‘go far enough to penalize or deter abuse;’ . . . and 
(5) failed to ‘meaningfully restrict abusive refilings or misuse of the automatic stay to prevent 
evictions.’”). In an effort to quell this abuse, the legislators created BAPCPA which was 
“more than 500 pages long, changes 83 sections of the Bankruptcy Code, and adds 17 new 
sections and one new chapter to the Bankruptcy Code.” See Hoffmann & Enslein, supra note 
22, at 300. 
 91. Braucher, Rash, supra note 28, at 479. 
 92. Id. at 479. 
 93. 11 U.S.C § 521 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
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ride-through option remains largely the same;94 however, three specific 
changes to other parts of § 521 affected the ride-through option.95 The first 
important change was the addition of § 521(a)(6) to the Bankruptcy Code.96 
Section 521(a)(6) now indicates that a debtor cannot retain any personal 
property “as to which a creditor has an allowed claim for the purchase price” 
in a chapter 7 bankruptcy unless he or she has either reaffirmed or redeemed 
the debt.97 Additionally, an enforcement mechanism for § 521(a)(6) has been 
provided in § 521(a)(7).98 Under § 521(a)(7), if the debtor retains the proper-
ty referred to in § 521(a)(6), then the automatic stay can be lifted.99 
The second important change affecting the personal property ride-
through option is the addition of § 521(d).100 Section 521(d) now provides 
 
 94. See id. at § 521(a)(2) (Supp. 2011). 
 95. See id. at §§ 521(a)(6), (a)(2)(B), (d) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 96. Id. at § 521(a)(6) (2006). This section provides the following: 
The debtor shall in a case under chapter 7 of this title in which the debtor is an 
individual, not retain possession of personal property as to which a creditor has 
an allowed claim for the purchase price secured in whole or in part by an interest 
in such personal property unless the debtor, not later than 45 days after the first 
meeting of creditors under section 341(a), either—(A) enters into an agreement 
with the creditor pursuant to section 524(c) with respect to the claim secured by 
such property; or (B) redeems such property from the security interest pursuant 
to section 722. 
Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(7). 
 99. Id. This section provides the following: 
If the debtor fails to so act within the 45-day period referred to in paragraph (6), 
the stay under section 362(a) is terminated with respect to the personal property 
of the estate or of the debtor which is affected, such property shall no longer be 
property of the estate, and the creditor may take whatever action as to such prop-
erty as is permitted by applicable nonbankruptcy law, unless the court determines 
on the motion of the trustee filed before the expiration of such 45-day period, and 
after notice and a hearing, that such property is of consequential value or benefit 
to the estate, orders appropriate adequate protection of the creditor’s interest, and 
orders the debtor to deliver any collateral in the debtor’s possession to the trus-
tee. 
Id. Under this section, the debtor cannot “retain possession of personal property to which the 
creditor has an allowed claim for the purchase price.” Id. at § 521(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
Some courts have interpreted this language as meaning that it is only applicable when the 
debtor retains property where the “creditor has an allowed claim for the purchase price.” See 
Hogan, supra note 26, at 914; MacKenna, supra note 29, at 682–83. If this were true, then the 
ride-through would be allowed when the debtor retained property in which the creditor does 
not have an “allowed claim for the purchase price.” Hogan, supra note 26, at 914; see 
MacKenna, supra note 29, at 682–83. However, even if this is the correct and § 521(a)(6) 
only applies to certain claims, § 362(h)—as discussed below—still provides that the automat-
ic stay will be lifted when the debtor retains any personal property that acts as collateral 
without redeeming or reaffirming. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2006). 
 100. 11 U.S.C. § 521(d). 
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that an ipso facto clause will become enforceable if the debtor does not file a 
statement of intention and perform those intentions as required for personal 
property.101 Because of this provision, the secured creditors are able to then 
consider the filing of the bankruptcy petition as a default under the con-
tract.102 This is an important addition because prior to BAPCPA, ipso facto 
clauses were considered unenforceable.103 
The third change can be found in § 521(a)(2)(B).104 Similarly to the 
pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code, this provision explains that “nothing . . . of 
this paragraph shall alter the debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to 
such property under this title. . . .”105 However, after the word “title” 
BAPCPA added the language, “except as provided in section 362(h).”106 
Section 362(h) presents a major change to the bankruptcy code by allowing 
the automatic stay to be lifted if the debtor does not file a statement of inten-
tion for personal property as required under the new § 521(a)(2)107 and does 
 
 101. Id. This section provides the following: 
If the debtor fails timely to take the action specified in subsection (a)(6) of this 
section, or in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 362(h), with respect to property 
which a lessor or bailor owns and has leased, rented, or bailed to the debtor or as 
to which a creditor holds a security interest not otherwise voidable under section 
522(f), 544, 545, 547, 548, or 549, nothing in this title shall prevent or limit the 
operation of a provision in the underlying lease or agreement that has the effect 
of placing the debtor in default under such lease or agreement by reason of the 
occurrence, pendency, or existence of a proceeding under this title or the insol-
vency of the debtor. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to justify limit-
ing such a provision in any other circumstance. 
Id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Hogan, supra note 26, at 902; MacKenna, supra note 29, at 679. 
 104. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 2011). This section provides the following: 
within 30 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under section 
341(a), or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 30-day 
period fixes, perform his intention with respect to such property, as specified by 
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; except that nothing in subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) of this paragraph shall alter the debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to 
such property under this title, except as provided in section 362(h). 
Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. at § 362(h)(1)(A) (2006). This section provides the following: 
In a case in which the debtor is an individual, the stay provided by subsection (a) 
is terminated with respect to personal property of the estate or of the debtor se-
curing in whole or in part a claim, or subject to an unexpired lease, and such per-
sonal property shall no longer be property of the estate if the debtor fails within 
the applicable time set by section 521(a)(2)—(A) to file timely any statement of 
intention required under section 521(a)(2) with respect to such personal property 
or to indicate in such statement that the debtor will either surrender such personal 
property or retain it and, if retaining such personal property, either redeem such 
personal property pursuant to section 722, enter into an agreement of the kind 
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not perform that intention in a “timely” manner.108 In other words, if the 
debtor does not choose one of the three options of reaffirmation, redemp-
tion, or exemption as specified under § 521(a)(2) for personal property and 
perform one of these three options, then the automatic stay can be lifted, and 
the creditor can attempt to repossess the collateral without violating the 
Bankruptcy Code.109 However, § 362(h)(1)(B) was amended to indicate that 
if the debtor proposes a reaffirmation agreement on the same terms of the 
original security agreement and the creditor refuses the offer, the debtor has 
essentially performed his intention as required.110 
Each of these amendments alters only the ride-through for personal 
property.111 BAPCPA added to and created provisions in which either the 
automatic stay can be lifted112 or debtors can be considered in default of 
their agreements with secured creditors when the debtor does not fulfill the 
requirements of § 521(a)(2) as to personal property.113 However, it is unclear 
exactly how the real property ride-through has been affected.114 In the end, 
 
specified in section 524(c) applicable to the debt secured by such personal prop-
erty, or assume such unexpired lease pursuant to section 365(p) if the trustee 
does not do so, as applicable; and (B) to take timely the action specified in such 
statement, as it may be amended before expiration of the period for taking action, 
unless such statement specifies the debtor’s intention to reaffirm such debt on the 
original contract terms and the creditor refuses to agree to the reaffirmation on 
such terms. 
Id. 
 108. Id. at § 362(h)(1)(B). 
 109. Id. at § 362(h)(1)(B). Several courts have indicated that a creditor can obtain the 
property after the automatic stay is lifted and the ipso facto clause becomes enforceable only 
if state law allows. E.g., In re Riggs, No. 06-60346, 2006 WL 2990218, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. Oct. 12, 2006). In Riggs, the court explained the following: 
Section 521(d) does not create a new statutory remedy to be used by creditors, 
and does not write ipso facto clauses into contracts where none exist . . . . Credi-
tors still must ensure that the contract, and their efforts to enforce the terms in it, 
do not run afoul of any applicable state laws. 
In re Riggs, 2006 WL 2990218, at * 3 (quoting In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 539 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)(B). 
 111. Braucher, Rash, supra note 28, at 479. Although the primary changes to the affected 
Bankruptcy Code dealt with personal property, one change did affect real property. See 11 
U.S.C. § 524(j). Now, under § 524(j), the secured creditor may remain in contact with the 
debtor after the debtor’s discharge when the creditor has “retain[ed] a security interest in real 
property that is the principle residence of the debtor,” contacting the debtor is in the “ordinary 
course of business,” and contacting the debtor is for the primary purpose of “obtaining peri-
odic payments associated with a valid security interest in lieu of pursuit of in rem relief to 
enforce the lien.” Id. 
 112. Id. at § 362(h)(1)(A)–(B). 
 113. Id. at § 521(d). 
 114. Braucher, Rash, supra note 28, at 482; Hogan, supra note 26, at 902–03; MacKenna, 
supra note 29, at 694. 
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by looking at the amendments and the current Bankruptcy Code, the impli-
cations of these changes are still unclear.115 
D. Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Court Rulings Post-BAPCPA 
Since BAPCPA, Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts have held that the 
personal property ride-through option has been effectively eliminated116 and 
the real property ride-through option is available.117 This section provides a 
brief discussion of the cases dealing with the ride-through option post-
BAPCPA and explains their ultimate holdings. 
1. Post-BAPCPA Personal Property Ride-Through in the Eighth 
Circuit 
Few bankruptcy courts within the Eighth Circuit have examined the 
personal property ride-through option post-BAPCPA.118 In In re Covel,119 
the bankruptcy court discussed—in dicta—that the personal property ride-
through option had been eliminated.120 However, in In re Riggs,121 the bank-
ruptcy court allowed the personal property ride-through after the court de-
termined that the reaffirmation agreement could not be approved.122 
In Covel, the bankruptcy court considered the validity of the personal 
property ride-through option when a debtor whose home was secured by a 
mortgage attempted to use the ride-through option to retain her home.123 
Although the debtor was attempting to use the real property ride-through 
option, the court mentioned the current status of the personal property ride-
through option in dicta, noting that it had been eliminated.124 
In analyzing the availability of the personal property ride-through, the 
court discussed the circuit split prior to BAPCPA and BAPCPA’s amend-
 
 115. Hogan, supra note 26, at 902–03; MacKenna, supra note 29, at 694. 
 116. See, e.g., In re Covel, 474 B.R. 702, 708 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2012); In re Riggs, No. 
06-60346, 2006 WL 2990218, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2006). 
 117. See, e.g., In re Covel, 474 B.R. at 708. 
 118. See e.g., In re Covel, 474 B.R. at 708; In re Root, No. 06-00090, 2006 WL 1050687, 
at *3–4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 11, 2006); In re Riggs, 2006 WL 2990218, at *4; In re Van 
Westen, No. 06-01006S, 2006 WL 3354997, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Oct. 26, 2006). This 
note focuses on Covel and Riggs. Covel provides the most recent analysis and explicitly dis-
cusses the law in regards to both the real and personal property ride-through options. 
 119. 474 B.R. 702 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2012). 
 120. Id. at 707. 
 121. In re Riggs, 2006 WL 2990218, at *1. Riggs is an unpublished opinion. However, it 
demonstrates how some courts within the Eighth Circuit are holding. 
 122. Id. at *6–7. 
 123. In re Covel, 474 B.R. at 703. 
 124. Id. at 708. 
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ments and additions to the Bankruptcy Code.125 The court noted that as a 
result of the new provisions, when the debtor wants to retain personal prop-
erty, “the remaining requirements . . . become applicable—she must specify 
that the property is claimed as exempt, that she intends to redeem the prop-
erty, or that she intends to reaffirm the debt . . . .”126 If the debtor then at-
tempts to ride-through, the automatic stay can be lifted, and the debtor can 
be held as in default if the security agreement includes the applicable provi-
sions.127 As a result, the personal property ride-through had been eliminat-
ed.128 
On the other hand, in Riggs, the bankruptcy court rejected a reaffirma-
tion agreement on debt secured by the debtor’s vehicle.129 In analyzing the 
reaffirmation, the court noted that the personal property ride-through option 
had essentially been eliminated.130 The court began by explaining that when 
the debtor does not choose reaffirmation, redemption, or exemption, the 
automatic stay can be lifted, and the creditor can enforce an ipso facto 
clause within the security agreement.131 Despite this, the court noted that a 
creditor can enforce the ipso facto clause only when state law allows.132 
After noting that the personal property ride-through option had been 
eliminated by BAPCPA, the Riggs court then evaluated the reaffirmation 
agreement and determined that it imposed an undue burden on the debtor.133 
As a result, the debtor was able to obtain a modified or limited ride-through 
option.134 The court explained that because the reaffirmation agreement was 
denied, the creditor could no longer enforce the agreement and “seek a defi-
ciency against the [d]ebtor if she default[ed]. [Also], since the [d]ebtor . . . 
performed her duty under § 521(a)(2) in filing her statement of intention and 
signing and filing the reaffirmation agreement within the prescribed time 
limits, § 362(h) and § 521(c)(6) [were] not applicable.”135 At that point, the 
debtor was able to retain the property in a way similar to a ride-through op-
tion.136 
 
 125. Id. at 704–09. 
 126. Id. at 708. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. 
 129. In re Riggs, No. 06-60346, 2006 WL 2990218, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 
2006). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at *3. 
 132. Id. at *4. 
 133. Id. at *6. 
 134. Id. 
 135. In re Riggs, 2006 WL 2990218, at *6. 
 136. Id. 
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Overall, the holdings of the Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts generally 
illustrate two interpretations of the personal property ride-through option.137 
The Covel court determined that the personal property ride-through option 
had been effectively eliminated while the Riggs court determined that the 
personal property ride-through option could be allowed when a debtor com-
plied with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. 
2. Post-BAPCPA Real Property Ride-Through 
Since BAPCPA, Covel is the only case in the Eighth Circuit concerning 
the issue of the existence of the real property ride-through option.138 In 
Covel, the bankruptcy court determined that the real property ride-through 
option is available to debtors.139 According to the court, because BAPCPA 
primarily altered the ride-through option for personal property and left the 
ride-through option for real property untouched, Congress intended for 
debtors to be able to ride-through debts secured by real property.140 The 
court explained that “Congress was aware that there was a ride through op-
tion for real property and intended to leave it intact post-BAPCPA.”141 
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court also explained that once a debtor 
chooses to ride-through, the creditor can still obtain relief in certain circum-
stances.142 In cases involving a real property ride-through, the creditor is not 
“precluded from requesting and obtaining relief from the automatic stay if 
the creditor has an interest in real property and believes the provisions of § 
362(d) providing relief from the automatic stay have been met.”143 In other 
words, if the creditor can meet the requirements of § 362(d) and the court 
grants the motion for relief from the automatic stay, the creditor can take 
certain actions to obtain the collateral.144 
In the end, the court held that the debtor met the requirements for the 
real property ride-through.145 The collateral was real property, and the debtor 
 
 137. See Marc S. Stern, Reaffirmation Under BAPCPA: Did the Ride-through Survive?, 
No. 1 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 3, Jan. 2007, at 3; Hogan, supra note 26, at 903–06. Some 
courts outside of the Eighth Circuit have indicated that the ride-through is also available 
where the creditor agrees. See In re Jensen, 407 B.R. 378, 389–90 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009). 
Other courts have indicated that the ride-through is available where state law allows. See In 
re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341, 351 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). However, these courts are relatively few 
in number. 
 138. In re Covel, 474 B.R. 702, 709 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2012). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 708. 
 141. Id. (quoting In re Caraballo, 386 B.R. 398, 402 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 709. 
 144. In re Covel, 474 B.R. at 709. 
 145. Id. 
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had filed a statement of intention indicating that she was choosing the ride-
through.146 Additionally, the creditor had never filed a motion for relief from 
automatic stay pursuant to § 362(d).147 Therefore, the debtor was able to 
retain the property and continue making payments.148 
Although the bankruptcy court in Covel held that Congress intended 
the real property ride-through as an option for debtors, some courts in other 
circuits have still held that this option is not available.149 These courts em-
brace the fact that BAPCPA did not alter the language of § 521(a)(2) as an 
indication that the interpretation of the statute has never changed.150 As a 
result, these courts utilize their circuits’ pre-BAPCPA interpretation of § 
521 that debtors cannot obtain the ride-through option.151 
For example, in In re Linderman152 the bankruptcy court evaluated the 
availability of the real property ride-through option when a debtor attempted 
to ride-through and retain his home.153 In doing so, the court noted that the 
language of § 521(a)(2) had not been altered and the bankruptcy amend-
ments affected only the personal property ride-through option.154 Additional-
ly, the court explained that bankruptcy courts that had considered the issue 
of the real property ride-through after BAPCPA “ultimately rested their 
opinions upon the established law that existed in their particular jurisdiction 
prior to BAPCPA.”155 
As a result, the bankruptcy court rejected the debtor’s argument that 
Congress implicitly approved the real property ride-through option through 
BAPCPA.156 The court explained that because “[t]he Eleventh Circuit clear-
ly has stated that a Chapter 7 debtor must either redeem or reaffirm a debt if 
the debtor wants to keep the collateral,” the real property ride-through was 
not an option.157 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See, e.g., In re Steinberg, 447 B.R. 355 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); Habersham Bank v. 
Harris (In re Harris), 421 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010); In re Linderman, 435 B.R. 715 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009). 
 150. See, e.g., In re Steinberg, 447 B.R. at 357; In re Harris, 421 B.R. at 600; In re Lin-
derman, 435 B.R. at 717–18. 
 151. In re Steinberg, 447 B.R. at 357; In re Harris, 421 B.R. at 600; In re Linderman, 435 
B.R. 717–18. 
 152. In re Linderman, 435 B.R. 715. 
 153. Id. at 715. 
 154. Id. at 716–17. 
 155. Id. at 718. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation was that “section 521(2) clearly provides 
that a debtor shall retain the property and reaffirm the debt, retain the property and redeem, or 
surrender the property.” Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1514 
(11th Cir. 1993). 
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Since BAPCPA, the controversy surrounding the real property ride-
through remains largely unchanged. No single uniform interpretation of the 
real property ride-through exists, and therefore, the application of the ride-
through remains confusing and controversial. 
III. ARGUMENT 
Because of the lack of direction from the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and BAPCPA’s amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the proper ap-
plication of the ride-through option for both personal and real property is 
unclear.158 Recent cases have offered that the personal property ride-through 
option was virtually eliminated,159 but have also explained that bankruptcy 
courts should allow the personal property ride-through option in certain lim-
ited circumstances.160 These cases also indicate that the real property ride-
through option is currently available.161 This section provides analysis of 
those cases, proposes a way that courts can apply a limited ride-through 
option in order to benefit all parties, and describes how this proposal reme-
dies all concerns of both creditors and debtors. 
A. Personal Property Decisions 
The dicta in Covel162 and the holding in Riggs163 regarding the personal 
property ride-through option were both correct. As both opinions explained, 
the 2005 statutory amendments and additions to the Bankruptcy Code con-
cerning the personal property ride-through option indicate that choosing 
between reaffirmation, exemption, and redemption when filing a statement 
of intention is now in the debtor’s best interest.164 
Although the original language surrounding the controversy was left 
unchanged by BAPCPA,165 the amended provisions now indicate that the 
 
 158. See supra Part II.D. 
 159. E.g., In re Covel, 474 B.R. 702, 708 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2012); In re Root, No. 06-
00090, 2006 WL 1050687, at *2–4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 11, 2006); In re Riggs, No. 06-
60346, 2006 WL 2990218, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2006); In re Van Westen, No. 
06-01006S, 2006 WL 3354997, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Oct. 26, 2006). 
 160. In re Riggs, 2006 WL 2990218, at *6–7. 
 161. In re Covel, 474 B.R. at 708–09. 
 162. Id. at 707. 
 163. In re Riggs, 2006 WL 2990218, at *6–7. 
 164. In re Covel, 474 B.R. at 708; In re Riggs, 2006 WL 2990218, at *3–4. See also 
Braucher, Guide, supra note 90, at 394 (“In chapter 7, the 2005 law eliminates ride-through 
with court protection on loans secured by personal property. . . .”); Stern, supra note 137, at 
3; Currie, supra note 90, at 267 (“BAPCPA amended the Bankruptcy Code to achieve these 
desired ends by precluding debtors from riding through the bankruptcy process while main-
taining possession of collateral with a nonrecourse loan.”). 
 165. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006). 
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personal property ride-through option has been largely eliminated.166 If the 
debtor attempts to retain personal property through the use of the ride-
through, the bankruptcy court can lift the automatic stay,167 the ipso facto 
clause in the original security agreement can become enforceable,168 and the 
secured creditor can gain the opportunity to repossess the collateral.169 
Despite this, bankruptcy courts can still allow the personal property 
ride-through option in limited situations170 while complying with the Bank-
ruptcy Code.171 For example, the bankruptcy court can allow the personal 
property ride-through option after the bankruptcy court’s rejection of a reaf-
firmation agreement.172 The automatic stay can be lifted, and any ipso facto 
clauses in the original security agreement become enforceable only when 
the debtor does not file a statement of intention indicating a choice of reaf-
firmation, redemption, or exemption and carry out that intention within thir-
ty days.173 However, at the point in the bankruptcy proceedings where the 
court considers the reaffirmation agreement, the debtor has filed an appro-
priate statement of intention and performed the actions indicated in the 
statement.174 As a result, the debtor has completed all statutory requirements.
 
175 
 
 166. Braucher, Guide, supra note 90, at 394. 
 167. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2006). 
 168. Id. at § 521(d). 
 169. In re Riggs, 2006 WL 2990218, at *3. 
 170. Stern, supra note 137, at 3 (“These new provisions point to a conclusion that the 
former ‘fourth option’ or ‘ride-through’ is no longer permitted; however, as a recent bank-
ruptcy court decision points out, that conclusion does not necessarily mean that a secured 
creditor of personal property gets to repossess collateral.”). 
 171. See In re Chim, 381 B.R. 191, 197–98 (Bankr. D. Md. 2008); In re Husain, 364 B.R. 
211, 218 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Moustafi, 371 B.R. 434, 438–39 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
2007); In re Quintero, No. 06-40163 TK, 2006 WL 1351623, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 
17, 2006). The personal property ride-through option might also be allowed when the creditor 
agrees. See Braucher, Rash supra note 28, at 474–77. 
 172. See In re Riggs, 2006 WL 2990218, at *6–7. 
 173. Id. at *6. 
 174. Id. (“And, since the Debtor has performed her duty under § 521(a)(2) in filing her 
statement of intention and signing and filing the reaffirmation agreement within the pre-
scribed time limits, § 362(h) and § 521(c)(6) are not applicable.”). 
 175. Id. Christopher Hogan explained the following in Will the Ride-through Ride 
Again?: 
Sections 362(h) and 521(a)(6) both impose penalties only after a Chapter 7 filer 
has failed to surrender, redeem, or reaffirm his debt. If a debtor chooses one of 
the three options, these sections cannot affect him. Thus, courts could open this 
backdoor ride-through: allow the debtor and his creditor to file a reaffirmation 
agreement, and then deny the agreement for not being in the best interest of the 
debtor or presenting an undue hardship on the debtor. 
Hogan, supra note 26, at 917–18. 
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It is important to note, however, that in order for this limited ride-
through option to be effective, courts should conduct an aggressive review 
and reject reaffirmation agreements when necessary.176 Generally, courts are 
able to review reaffirmation agreements if the presumption of an undue 
hardship arises.177 This occurs “if the debtor’s monthly income less the 
debtor’s monthly expenses as shown on the debtor’s completed and signed 
statement in support of such agreement required under subsection (k)(6)(A) 
is less than the scheduled payments on the reaffirmed debt.”178 However, 
different courts consider the agreements differently.179 Some courts perform 
a much more in depth review of the income and expenses while others 
choose only to review the debtor’s statement in support.180 For this limited 
ride-through option to be effective, a more in depth review is appropriate.181 
“Some courts have embraced the backdoor ride-through to protect debtors 
from unreasonable reaffirmations. Consistent refusal of reaffirmations with 
worse terms could force creditors to offer reaffirmations with the same or 
better terms, which would prevent debtors from being forced into Chapter 
13 bankruptcy.”182 
A second version of the limited option is also possible. Bankruptcy 
courts can allow a limited personal property ride-through option when the 
debtor offers to enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the creditor on the 
same terms as the original security agreement, and the creditor refuses the 
offer.183 Section 362(h)(1)(B) now provides that after a debtor files a state-
ment of intention, the automatic stay can be lifted when the debtor does not 
“take timely the action specified in such statement . . . unless such statement 
specifies the debtor’s intention to reaffirm such debt on the original contract 
terms and the creditor refuses to agree to the reaffirmation on such terms.”184 
This indicates that as long as the debtor has attempted to enter into a reaf-
firmation agreement with the creditor for the same terms as the original se-
curity agreement, the requirements of § 521(a)(2) have been met.185 Thus, 
the personal property ride-through should be allowed at that point. 
 
 176. See Hogan, supra note 26, at 918. 
 177. Lisa A. Napoli, Reaffirmation After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005: Many Questions, Some Answers, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259, 265 
(2007). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. at 267–70. 
 180. See id. 
 181. Hogan, supra note 26, at 918 (indicating that some believe that the allowance of this 
limited ride-through is considered judicial activism). 
 182. Id. at 919. 
 183. Id. at 916. 
 184. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)(B) (2006). 
 185. See id. 
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Both of these instances indicate that the personal property ride-through 
could be available in limited circumstances. However, the debtor must first 
attempt to fully comply with the Bankruptcy Code. If this is done properly, 
then the debtor can obtain the benefit of the ride-through option in some 
situations. 
B. Real Property Decision 
In considering the real property ride-through option, the decision in 
Covel should be reevaluated. In Covel, the bankruptcy court initially applied 
the correct analytical framework for the issue; however, the court erred in 
determining that the original “if applicable” language allowed an unfettered 
real property ride-through option.186
 
Rather, the court should have deter-
mined that the language of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor 
must choose between reaffirmation, redemption, and exemption when filing 
a statement of intention, but once the debtor completes the requirements of § 
521, a limited real property ride-through can be available in certain situa-
tions.187 
The language concerning the current real property ride-through option 
is much the same as the language for the original combined real and person-
al property ride-through options for both real and personal property prior to 
BAPCPA. 188  Accordingly, the statutory interpretation also remains the 
same.189 However, because the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not in-
terpreted the statutory language,190 the lower courts must attempt to do so. 
 
 186. In re Covel, 474 B.R. 702, 705 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2012). 
 187. See generally United States v. Cacioppo, 460 F.3d 1012, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006) (ex-
plaining that when interpreting statutory language, start with the plain meaning of the stat-
ute). 
 188. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (Supp. 2011); see also In re Steinberg, 447 B.R. 355, 357 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (applying pre-BAPCPA precedent); Habersham Bank v. Harris (In re 
Harris), 421 B.R. 597, 600 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010) (applying pre-BAPCPA precedent); In re 
Linderman, 435 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (applying pre-BAPCPA precedent). 
 189. See In re Harris, 421 B.R. at 600; In re Linderman, 435 B.R. at 718. “Each of the 
bankruptcy courts that have addressed the propriety of allowing a ride through with regard to 
real property after the enactment of the BAPCPA has relied on the earlier precedent of its 
respective circuit court . . . .” In re Covel, 474 B.R. 702, 708 n.10 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2012); 
see also In re Sosa, 443 B.R. 263, 269 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2011) (relying on pre-BAPCPA prece-
dent); In re Hart, 402 B.R. 78, 83 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (relying on pre-BAPCPA precedent); 
In re Caraballo, 386 B.R. 398, 402 (Bankr. D. Conn 2008) (relying on pre-BAPCPA prece-
dent); In re Steinberg, 447 B.R. at 357 (relying on pre-BAPCPA precedent); In re Waller, 
394 B.R. 111, 114 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008) (relying on pre-BAPCPA precedent); In re Wilson, 
372 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007) (relying on pre-BAPCPA precedent). 
 190. In re Covel, 474 B.R. at 704. 
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The Covel court appropriately first considered the statutory language.191 
At this point, however, the bankruptcy court began to err. As the Eighth 
Circuit explained in United States v. Cacioppo,192 “[w]here the language is 
plain, we need inquire no further.”193 In Covel, the bankruptcy court chose to 
analyze the legislative intent and, in turn, incorrectly interpreted the statute 
as implicitly allowing the real property ride-through option.194 
Although the language of § 521(a)(2) is often suggested to be ambigu-
ous, the language is actually plain, and the explicit reading of the statute 
provides the most sensible interpretation.195 The meaning behind the “if ap-
plicable” language does not imply that the three statutory options of reaffir-
mation, redemption, or exemption are “applicable” when a non-statutory 
ride-through option is not chosen by the debtor.196 Rather, when retaining by 
reaffirmation, redemption, or exemption, the chosen option becomes appli-
cable and must be specified in the statement of intention while the other two 
do not.197 This is not only the most realistic reading but is also the reading 
that best interprets the “plain English” of the statute.198 
In Section 521(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Creditor’s Predicament 
in Getting Paid as Agreed, Jim Pappas—who argued against the real proper-
ty ride-through option—also accurately interpreted the statutory language as 
follows: 
[T]he “if applicable” phrase can also be read to refer to the options listed 
in the statute, as opposed to other non-specified choices. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he debtor may be unable to redeem an asset, or unable to exempt 
it, or denied the right to reaffirm the debt. Nonetheless, the debtor must 
list the debt and property in the Section 521(2) statement of intention. In 
all these situations, then, the “if applicable” provision of Section 521(2) 
simply refers to whether the debtor may lawfully elect to redeem, exempt 
 
 191. Id. at 704–06. 
 192. Cacioppo, 460 F.3d 1012. 
 193. Id. at 1016. 
 194. In re Covel, 474 B.R. at 708. 
 195. See Jim D. Pappas, Section 521(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Creditor’s Predic-
ament in Getting Paid as Agreed, 99 COM. L.J. 45, 56 (1994); Michael P. Alley, Comment, 
Redemption, Reaffirmation, Exemption, and Retention in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy: Extinction 
Looms Near for the Free Ride, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 683, 744–45 (1999); see also Kenneth P. 
Coleman, When a Chapter 7 Debtor Owes Secured Consumer Debt: Is There a Fourth Op-
tion in Addition to Surrender, Redemption, and Reaffirmation?, 115 BANKING L.J. 377, 383–
84 (1998) (indicating why the explicit reading of the statute is the most sensible interpretation 
of the statute). 
 196. Pappas, supra note 195, at 62. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 56. 
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or reaffirm. The debtor is directed to make an election of those options 
listed in Section 521(2) that are applicable to the facts of the case.
199 
Reading the language contrary to this interpretation creates meaning 
that is not supported by “plain English.”200 
Despite this interpretation, a limited real property ride-through option 
can be applied in limited circumstances while still complying with the plain 
language of the Bankruptcy Code.201 For example, when a debtor and credi-
tor enter into a reaffirmation agreement, but the agreement is not approved 
by the bankruptcy court,202 the real property ride-through option should be 
allowed. The resulting ride-through option is similar to that proposed for 
personal property, but the analysis of the statutory language is different.203 
For real property, the Bankruptcy Code requires only that the debtor file a 
statement of intention and “perform his intention with respect to such prop-
erty.”204 The Bankruptcy Code indicates that the automatic stay can be lifted, 
and the ipso facto clauses can become enforceable for personal property.205 
Thus, if the debtor files a statement of intention and performs that intention, 
then the debtor has fully complied with the Bankruptcy Code, and nothing 
more is required.206 As a consequence, allowing the real property ride-
through option after the court rejects the proposed reaffirmation agreement 
or determines that the reaffirmation is not enforceable does not violate the 
plain language of the Bankruptcy Code. 
On the other hand, bankruptcy courts probably would not allow the real 
property ride-through option after the debtor proposes similar terms for the 
reaffirmation as were in the original security agreement and the creditor 
refuses to agree.207 Under § 362(h)(1)(B), this is available only when the 
 
 199. Id. at 62. 
 200. Id. at 56. 
 201. See Waxman, supra note 15, at 203 (“Therefore, perhaps it is time for appropriate 
legislative reform to resolve the issue in an evenhanded manner both for debtors and credi-
tors. . . . The debtor wants to keep the collateral; the creditor wants what he bargained for—
the debtor’s personal obligation on the debt.”). 
 202. Although § 524(c)–(d) now explains that reaffirmation agreements that involve real 
property no longer have to be approved by the court, § 524(m) still requires that these agree-
ments be approved in certain circumstances. “Under section 524(m), a rebuttable presump-
tion of undue hardship arises if the difference between the debtor’s income and expenses is 
less than the payment on the reaffirmed debt. . . . Unlike the provisions discussed above, 
section 524(m) applies to consumer debts secured by real property.” In re Hart, 402 B.R. 78, 
86 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). 
 203. See supra Part III.A. 
 204. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 2011). 
 205. See supra Part II.C.  
 206. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2). 
 207. See supra Part III.A. 
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collateral is personal property.208 Because of this, the bankruptcy court’s 
allowance of this option would rely solely on its interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and whether the debtor has sufficiently “perform[ed] his inten-
tion” as required by § 521(a)(2)(B).209 
When dealing with reaffirmation agreements, courts have interpreted 
exactly what a debtor must do to “perform his intention” in different ways. 
Some courts have indicated that if a debtor proposed terms for a reaffirma-
tion agreement, but the creditor rejected those terms, that the debtor had 
adequately complied with § 521(a)(2).210 Other courts have held that, in or-
der to comply with § 521(a)(2), the parties must actually enter into a reaf-
firmation agreement.211 Despite these interpretations, the plain language of 
the Bankruptcy Code seems to contemplate that the parties must enter into a 
reaffirmation agreement rather than merely negotiate. Section 521(a)(2)(A) 
states that a debtor can indicate on his or her statement of intention the “in-
ten[t] to reaffirm debts secured by such property,” 212  while section 
521(a)(2)(B) states that the debtor must “perform his intention with respect 
to such property.”213 In looking at this language, it is clear that the debtor 
must “perform his intention” to “reaffirm debts secured” by the property, 
rather than take steps or make an effort to reaffirm the property.214 Conse-
quently, this option is likely not available when the collateral is real proper-
ty. 
Overall, debtors should be able to obtain the real property ride-through 
option in limited circumstances. The language of the Bankruptcy Code indi-
cates that the debtor must initially comply with the requirements of § 
521(a)(2), and if these actions are adequately completed, the debtor may be 
able to retain their real property in limited situations. 
 
 208. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)(B) (2006). 
 209. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 2011). The limited ride-through also complies with 
other sections of the code. See supra note 101. 
 210. See Price v. Del. State Police Fed. Credit Union U.S. Tr. (In re Price), 370 F.3d 362, 
372 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Section 521(2)(B) should not be read as mandating that debtors must 
entirely consummate their stated intention within forty-five days.”). 
 211. In re Anderson, 348 B.R. 652, 658 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (indicating that the plain 
language meant that the debtors had to actually reaffirm the debt in order to “perform their 
stated intention”); In re Edwards, 236 B.R. 124, 126 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (“This Court also 
noted that if a Chapter 7 debtor chooses to retain estate property through reaffirmation, not 
only must he or she reaffirm the relevant debt within the § 521(2) time constraints in order to 
avoid establishing cause allowing relief from the stay, but the reaffirmation agreement must 
be executed before discharge for it to be enforceable.”). 
 212. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2011). 
 213. Id. at § 521(a)(2)(B). 
 214. See id. 
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C. Policy Concerns 
In addition to being statutorily sound, the limited personal and real 
property ride-through options also remedy many policy concerns. Prior to 
BAPCPA, many courts expressed concern that allowing a general ride-
through option infringed on certain interests of the debtors,215 while other 
courts expressed concern that disallowing the ride-through also infringed on 
certain interests of the creditors.216 
In considering disallowing the ride-through option, courts have specifi-
cally explained that if debtors are restricted to the three statutory options of 
reaffirmation, redemption, or exemption, debtors will be forced into an un-
favorable position.217 Specifically, debtors would not be able to obtain a 
“fresh start.”218 As one bankruptcy court noted, most debtors would not be 
able to afford redemption by paying the entire remaining amount of the debt, 
and surrender would “deprive a debtor of much needed property.”219 Addi-
tionally, reaffirmation can be completed only with the creditor’s approval.220 
As a result, the “reaffirmation [would] involve[] negotiation between parties 
with unequal bargaining power,” and the creditor would obtain “an effective 
veto on the ‘fresh start.’”221 
Other bankruptcy courts have expressed concern that allowing the ride-
through option implicates the creditor’s position.222 Specifically, if debtors 
are allowed to ride-through in any way, it would be unlikely that many 
would choose reaffirmation.223 No debtor would choose reaffirmation and 
maintain personal liability when they can ride-through and eventually have 
no personal liability.224 Additionally, when a debtor is allowed to ride-
through and obtain a discharge of the personal liability, debtors often lose 
motivation to care for the property.225 In the end, many courts believe that 
the ride-through option essentially gives the debtor a “head start” rather than 
a “fresh start” and “effectively converts his secured obligation from recourse 
 
 215. E.g., In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. 286 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002). Because most 
of these concerns were expressed pre-BAPCPA, the ride-through option considered at the 
time was a general ride-through option for both real and personal property. 
 216. E.g., In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 
302 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992). 
 217. See In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 289. 
 218. Id. (quoting Capital Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 
F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 219. Id. (quoting In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. (quoting In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51). 
 222. E.g., In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 302, 304 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295, 297 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (citing Taylor v. AGE 
Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1515–16 (11th Cir. 1993)). 
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to nonrecourse with no downside risk for failing to maintain or insure the 
lender’s collateral.”226 
A limited ride-through option would solve most of the Eighth Circuit 
bankruptcy courts’ policy concerns. First, the limited ride-through option 
would effectively balance the bargaining power between the debtor and 
creditor.227 A creditor will be more willing to agree to favorable terms while 
negotiating a reaffirmation agreement because it will realize that its rejec-
tion of reaffirmation agreements in certain situations or the court’s general 
rejection of a reaffirmation agreement could result in the ride-through and 
the debtor’s discharge of personal liability.228 Because of this, a debtor 
would be able to obtain a fresh start and could not be forced into any unfa-
vorable reaffirmation agreement at the same time. 229 
Also, the limited ride-through option would ensure that debtors contin-
ue to enter into reaffirmation agreements.230 Without the ride-through op-
tion, the debtor would have no other alternative than to choose between the 
statutory options of reaffirmation, redemption, and exemption.231 Generally, 
because debtors want to retain the property as a whole and cannot afford to 
redeem the property, reaffirmation would become the most favored 
choice.232 
Last, this option would safeguard the creditor’s interest in the collat-
eral.233 With the limited ride-through option, the debtor would be able to 
retain the property only if the debtor chose redemption or reaffirmation.234 In 
both of these cases, the creditor’s interest is fully protected.235 After redemp-
tion, the debt is completely paid off, while after reaffirmation the debtor 
retains personal liability.236 As a result, the creditor’s ability to collect on the 
debt would not be diminished in any way, unless the creditor knowingly 
attempted to force the debtor into an unfavorable reaffirmation agreement. 
 
 226. See In re Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516. 
 227. See In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. 286, 289 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002) (discussing 
the problem of lack of bargaining power). 
 228. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 229. See In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 289. 
 230. See In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 302, 304 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) (discussing how 
debtors would not enter into reaffirmation agreements when the ride-through is available). 
 231. See id. 
 232. In re Canady-Houston, 281 B.R. at 289 (citing Capital Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union 
v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 233. In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295, 297 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (citing Taylor v. AGE 
Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1993)) (discussing how debt-
ors often do not take care of property after using the ride-through option). 
 234. See supra Part III.B. 
 235. See In re Gerling, 175 B.R. at 297. 
 236. See supra Part II.A. 
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The limited ride-through option is the most functional compromise for 
both debtors and creditors. It not only correctly applies the statutory lan-
guage, but also takes into consideration both debtors’ and creditors’ best 
interests. Debtors are able to obtain a fresh start and are not forced into un-
favorable reaffirmation agreements. Also, debtors will continue to attempt to 
reaffirm the debt, and the collateral is adequately protected. In the end, the 
limited personal property ride-through is the best option. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the years, the application of the ride-through option within 
the Eighth Circuit has been unclear. Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, the 
Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts were split. Some courts interpreted § 
521(a)(2) as allowing a ride-through option, while others interpreted the 
statute as not allowing it. Then, in 2005, BAPCPA greatly amended and 
added to the Bankruptcy Code, and, in doing so, the ride-through option was 
slightly altered. Despite this, the confusion has remained. 
Since BAPCPA, some Eighth Circuit bankruptcy courts have ruled on 
the issue; however, their holdings have not created a clear set of rules for the 
ride-through option. Those courts that considered the current standing of the 
personal property ride-through option determined that the ride-through op-
tion had been generally eliminated. However, one court still held that the 
personal property ride-through option could be allowed in limited circum-
stances. On the other hand, one court determined that the real property ride-
through was available to debtors. 
These courts’ holdings concerning the personal property ride-through 
were correct. Because of the BAPCPA amendments, the Bankruptcy Code 
now allows the automatic stay to be lifted and ipso facto clauses to become 
enforceable when the debtor does not comply with § 521(a)(2). As a result, 
the use of the personal property ride-through was eliminated. However, the 
Bankruptcy Code does allow the ride-through when a debtor complies with 
the provisions of § 521(a)(2). If the debtor files a statement of intention and 
performs that intention within a certain period of time, the automatic stay is 
not lifted, and the ipso facto clauses do not become enforceable. Thus, when 
the debtor enters into a reaffirmation agreement with the secured creditor, 
and the court rejects the reaffirmation agreement, then the debtor should be 
able to ride-through. Additionally, § 362(h)(1)(B) now provides that if a 
debtor offers the creditor to reaffirm the debt on the original terms, and the 
creditor rejects the offer, the automatic stay is not lifted. Consequently, the 
ride-through should be allowed. These options are clearly supported by the 
language of the Bankruptcy Code and policy concerns. 
On the other hand, the holding that the real property ride-through is 
available to debtors was incorrect. The language concerning the real proper-
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ty ride-through clearly indicates that debtors can choose only reaffirmation, 
redemption, or exemption for retention when filing a statement of intention. 
However, a limited option can be available in certain circumstances. If the 
debtor chooses reaffirmation and the parties enter into a reaffirmation 
agreement, when the bankruptcy court rejects the agreement, the debtor 
should be allowed to ride-through. At that point, the debtor will have per-
formed all that was required under § 521(a)(2). This option is also supported 
by the language of the Bankruptcy Code and policy concerns. 
In the end, the limited ride-through option for both real and personal 
property should be implemented in the Eighth Circuit. This option clearly 
applies the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and considers the con-
cerns of both the debtors and the creditors. Thus, the result allows an opti-
mal situation for both parties. 
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